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G U E S T  E D I T O R ’ S  O B S E R V A T I O N S
The New Politics of Sentencing
MICHAEL M. O’HEAR
Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School
With this Issue, the Federal Sentencing Reporter concludes its two-issue survey of recent sentenc-
ing reform developments at the state level. The previous Issue focused on drug reforms, particu-
larly a series of ballot initiatives in four states mandating treatment in lieu of incarceration for low-
level drug offenders.1 The present Issue places those developments in a broader context. Within
the past two years, more than a dozen states have adopted important sentencing reforms. Surpris-
ingly, given the general trajectory of sentencing law over the past three decades, most of the
current state-level reforms are calculated to reduce  sentence lengths (albeit sometimes rather
obliquely). Perhaps most notably, legislatures have scaled back mandatory minimums in Connecti-
cut, Indiana, Louisiana, and North Dakota. Thus, one can now ask with a straight face the
question posed by Marc Mauer in this Issue: ÒIs the get-tough era in sentencing coming to a
close?Ó
Recent state reforms may indeed suggest a fundamental change in sentencing politics. Not
coincidentally, however, they have occurred during a period of economic stress. Shrinking tax
revenues put pressure on all aspects of a stateÕs budget. Corrections spending is no exception.
Thus, successful reform efforts across the country, from California to Louisiana to Virginia, have
focused on the cost-savings that can be achieved by reducing the size of prison populations. Yet, as
the contributions to this Issue emphasize, Þscal pressures cannot by themselves explain the
current move away from long mandatory prison terms. Rather, recent state reforms must also be
understood as a reßection of social justice concerns and a willingness to employ rehabilitative,
instead of purely punitive, approaches to criminal justice problems. Sentence-reducing reforms
may thus hold appeal for both Þscal conservatives and social liberals. Not surprisingly, then,
reform in many states has been a bipartisan affair. What remains to be seen is whether short-term
economic pressures will provide an impetus for far-sighted reform in other states, or, alternatively,
promote the adoption of ill-advised quick Þxes.
Contributions to this Issue consider recent state developments from three perspectives. First,
Marc Mauer, Daniel Wilhelm, and Nicholas Turner offer a national perspective, summarizing
recent developments and identifying important patterns across states. Second, Michael Lawlor and
Thomas Hammer provide more detailed accounts of recent developments in Connecticut and
Wisconsin, respectively. Their articles are complemented by a recent report from the Kansas
Sentencing Commission, which also offers an in-depth, state-speciÞc perspective on current
reforms. Finally, two recent reports from the Department of JusticeÕs Bureau of Justice Statistics
provide a statistical perspective on state-level trends and experiences.
I. National Perspectives
Daniel Wilhelm and Nicholas Turner of the Vera Institute of Justice focus on the role of costs in
sentencing and corrections policy. They ask, perhaps facetiously, ÒShould cost matter when it
comes to deciding who goes to prison and for how long?Ó From a state perspective, the answer
must be Òyes.Ó (The answer would perhaps be different at the federal level, where government has
greater resources, more limited criminal justice responsibilities, and a freer hand to operate in the
red.) Assuming the importance of cost, Wilhelm and Turner identify three contrasting approaches
that states might use to control corrections spending.
First, states may cut corrections budgets without making changes to underlying sentencing
policies. Wilhelm and Turner catalog a litany of prison closures, staff reductions, and program cuts
in states across the country. They are appropriately skeptical about whether these strategies, in and
of themselves, represent viable long-term solutions to burgeoning corrections budgets. They
particularly question the elimination of educational, substance-abuse treatment, and vocational
4 F E D E R A L  S E N T E N C I N G  R E P O R T E R  ·  V O L .  1 5 ,  N O.  1  ·  O C TO B E R  2 0 0 2
Recent state reforms may indeed
suggest a fundamental change in
sentencing politics. Not coinciden-
tally, however, they have occurred
during a period of  economic stress.
programs. Second, Wilhelm and Turner discuss sentencing policy changes. Here, they
highlight the recent elimination of mandatory minimums in some states. Yet, while they
seem less dubious of these reforms than the direct budget cuts, Wilhelm and Turner plainly
prefer a more systematic approach. Thus, Þnally, they turn to structural reforms that would
permanently link substantive sentencing law to Þscal constraints. Interestingly, the three
states they hold out as models (North Carolina, Kansas, and Virginia) adopted their reforms
in the 1990Õs, prior to the current economic downturn. They focus on the need for a state
sentencing commission that devises sentencing guidelines with an eye to resource limita-
tions, advises the legislature on the Þscal consequences of sentencing policy proposals, and
develops empirically based risk-assessment tools for the purpose of diverting low-risk
offenders from the prison system. It is hard to quarrel with Wilhelm and TurnerÕs vision of a
more rational sentencing policymaking process, although WisconsinÕs tortured journeyÑ
detailed in this Issue by Thomas HammerÑsuggests that the politics of this sort of reform
may not be simple. Additionally, it remains uncertain whether a time of budgetary crisis is
indeed favorable for this sort of reform, which promises long-term beneÞts but requires
immediate expenditures in order to establish a new sentencing bureaucracy.
The recommendations of Wilhelm and Turner are echoed in the document reprinted here
from the American Bar AssociationÕs Criminal Justice Section, Blueprint for Cost-Effective
Pretrial Detention, Sentencing and Corrections  Systems . The Blueprint was endorsed by the
ABAÕs House of Delegates in August 2002. The Blueprint characterizes Þscal pressures as a
ÒcatalystÓ for reform, but acknowledges that its recommendations advance Òmany of the
justice-related goals for which the ABA has long advocated.Ó In Part IV below, however, I
raise some questions about the long-term prospects for a marriage between Þscal and justice
agendas.
In his article, Marc Mauer, Assistant Director of The Sentencing Project, is less concerned
with speciÞc policy choices than zeitgeist. He asks whether the get-tough era is coming to an
end. Like Wilhelm and Turner, he notes that several states have recently scaled back manda-
tory minimums, while others have adopted mandatory treatment for low-level drug offenders.
Mauer sets these reforms within a context of a long-term decline in crimes rates, changing
political and economic realities, and growing public receptivity to alternative sanctions. Yet,
Mauer ends his article on an appropriately ambivalent note. As he suggests, it is indeed too
early to tell whether the get-tough era is coming to end. Public attitudes may well revert to a
punitive orientation when crime rates reboundÑas some evidence suggests is already
happening2Ñand Þscal pressures ease. Moreover, as Mauer also suggests, the prison-building
boom of the 1990Õs tied the economic welfare of many communities to punitive criminal
justice policies; these interests can be expected to resist any signiÞcant reorientation away
from the policies of the 1990Õs.
II. The View From the States
In his article, Representative Michael Lawlor, who chairs ConnecticutÕs House Judiciary
Committee, details his stateÕs experience with mandatory minimums, culminating in a
successful legislative effort in 2001 to restore greater discretion to judges at sentencing. In
many respects, the Connecticut case study represents an archetypal example of recent state-
level reforms. Drug sentencing was the principal target of reformers, who questioned both
the efÞcacy and the fairness of long mandatory sentences for non-violent drug offenders. Yet,
reform efforts did not reach the top of the legislative agenda until Connecticut faced a budget
crisis. Then, with the backing of a Republican governor, the state legislature easily passed a
bipartisan reform bill.
Lawlor touts his stateÕs success in scaling back mandatory minimums as a ÒmodelÓ for
other states, and even the federal government. At the same time, he appropriately notes
various unique characteristics that facilitated reform in Connecticut, such as the relatively
nonpolitical orientation of the stateÕs judges and prosecutors. Still, the adoption of similar
reforms in a state like LouisianaÑsurely as culturally and economically distinct from
Connecticut as any two states can beÑsuggests that Lawlor may be justiÞed in proposing
Connecticut as a national model.
Next, Professor Thomas Hammer describes reforms in Wisconsin, which were adopted in
two phases between 1998 and 2002. These reforms, far more systematic and comprehensive
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than ConnecticutÕs, effectuated the stateÕs transition from indeterminate sentencing to
truth-in-sentencing. The Þrst phase abolished parole. The second, adopted earlier this year
after a lengthy period of legislative gridlock, eliminated most mandatory minimums and
penalty enhancers; established a new sentencing commission and temporary sentencing
guidelines; and provided for early release of some prisoners (notwithstanding the nominal
abolition of parole). These most recent reforms, like ConnecticutÕs, are intended to promote
more selective use of prison resources during a time of Þscal crisis. In particular, the state
faced the prospect of a rapidly expanding prison population because judges did not ad-
equately adjust their sentencing practices so as to compensate for the abolition of traditional
parole.3
Complementing HammerÕs article, this Issue excerpts portions of WisconsinÕs new
sentencing guidelines. Wisconsin considered and rejected the federal guidelines as a model,
adopting instead advisory guidelines. The guidelines, comprised of offense-speciÞc
worksheets and explanatory notes, provide a checklist of relevant offense and offender
characteristics. The guidelines also make clear the appropriateness of probation for many
categories of offenders who have relatively little criminal history.
Rounding out the state-speciÞc materials, this Issue also excerpts a 2002 report from the
Kansas Sentencing Commission to the state legislature. Exemplifying the sort of delibera-
tive, cost-conscious role that Wilhelm and Turner envision for state sentencing commis-
sions, the Kansas Commission proposes an elaborate and thoughtful series of reforms
comprised of three chief components: the administrative consolidation of probation,
community corrections, and parole; the development of a new risk/needs assessment tool;
and the diversion of low-level drug offenders from prison to treatment. In keeping with
other reforms discussed in this Issue, the Kansas proposal aims to divert from prison low-
risk offenders who may safely remain in the community. At the same time, the proposal
helpfully recognizes the need for improved community supervision services as a precondi-
tion for enhanced diversion.
III.National Statistical Studies
The Issue concludes with a pair of recent reports issued by the United States Department of
JusticeÕs Bureau of Justice Statistics (ÒBJSÓ). The Þrst constitutes one of the most ambitious
empirical studies of recidivism in recent years. The researchers tracked rearrest,
reconviction, and reincarceration rates for 272,111 state inmates who were released in 1994.
More than two-thirds of the released inmates were rearrested within three years, while
slightly below one-half were reconvicted within the same time frame. These numbers are
comparable to, or higher than, numbers from a similar BJS study of prisoners released in
1983.
To the extent that the current BJS study is read as a report card on the get-tough policies
adopted in the 1980Õs and 1990ÕsÑas some critics have done4Ñthe grades are, at best,
mixed. Insofar as harsher sentencing was intended to deter repeat offenders, there is reason
to doubt the success of that strategy. Indeed, if anything, overall recidivism rates increased
from the mid-1980Õs to the mid-1990Õs. (At the same time, it is important to note that
harsher sentencing may be justiÞed on grounds other than deterring recidivism, such as a
desire to advance retributive objectives.)
The BJS report also holds interest in other respects. High rates of recidivism raise
concerns that, if measures to reduce prison populations are not implemented carefully,
public safety may be compromised, which could prompt a backlash against the new policies.
Yet, the report also demonstrates that recidivism rates are not uniformly high, but, rather,
varyÑsometimes quite dramaticallyÑaccording to such factors as criminal history and
offense of conviction. This data lends further support to the sort of risk assessment tool that
is advocated by Wilhelm and Turner.
The BJS report also underscores the critical need for states to focus on reentry programs.
The researchers estimate that more than a quarter of the reincarcerated inmates were
returned to prison for a technical violation of parole conditions. Moreover, the data indicates
that the vast majority of recidivism occurs in the Þrst year following release. Statistics such
as these suggest a need to rethink the structure of post-release supervision, as Kansas is
doing.
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The second BJS study included in this Issue describes nationwide incarceration trends
through 2001. The statistics tell three stories that are of particular interest in this context.
First, the record numbers of Americans being held in custodyÑone in every 146 U.S.
residents is now incarcerated in a state or federal prison or local jailÑprovide a dramatic
illustration of the legacy of the get-tough policies of the past twenty years. Second, while the
U.S. prison population continues to grow, the rate of growth has slowed steadily since 1995 to
a rather stable level of 1.1% in 2001. This trend may to some extent reßect new policies and
attitudes towards incarceration.
Third, the nationwide statistics mask quite dramatic differences among the states. While
ten states have increased their prison population by more than 50% since 1995, four states
have actually reduced their prison population during the same time period. Incarceration
rates in different states range from 127 persons to 800 persons per 100,000 residents. The
get-tough 1990Õs did not leave a uniformly deep imprint on all states; the new eraÑif indeed
a new era has begunÑwill also surely be experienced quite differently across the country.
IV. Unanswered Questions
The recent state developments highlighted in this and the previous Issue represent a nascent
trend towards a more selective use of incarceration. Yet, the future of this trend remains in
many respects quite uncertain. An overarching question, of course, is whether any additional
states will go the way of Connecticut, Wisconsin, and the other states that have recently
adopted reforms. Efforts to soften New YorkÕs Rockefeller drug laws, for instance, appear
stalled. MichiganÕs intriguing ballot initiative on drug sentencingÑreprinted and discussed
in the previous FSR Issue on state developments5Ñwas removed in September from the state
ballot for technical defects.6 Assuming, however, that the trend towards more selective use of
incarceration continues to develop at the state level, many important questions remain as to
the content and politics of reform. A few of these questions are suggested below.
A. What Is the Ultimate Purpose of  Reform?
Two different types of purposes animate recent state reforms: (1) saving taxpayer dollars, and
(2) achieving substantive changes in criminal justice policy (e.g., moving drug sentencing
from a punitive to a treatment-oriented approach). These different sorts of objectives are by
no means necessarily inconsistent. Indeed, recent reform efforts have succeeded precisely by
emphasizing statutory changes that promise to deliver better policy at a lower cost. Yet, it is
perhaps nave to think that the current strange-bedfellows coalitions of Þscal conservatives
and criminal justice liberals will Þnd many reforms upon which they can agree, or, indeed,
that the coalitions will hold together as underlying economic and social conditions change.
For instance, conservatives may support drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration
in order to cut corrections budgets. A commitment in principle to treatment, however, is not
a commitment to any particular type of treatment program or level of funding. In practice,
budget-minded legislators may systematically underfund treatment programs, or oppose
controversial treatment tools, like methadone. Operating under these sorts of constraints,
treatment may not live up expectations. Confronted with high failure rates, supporters may
have difÞculty justifying treatment-oriented strategies on a dollars-and-cents basis, and pro-
treatment coalitions may fracture.
One may easily envision analogous scenarios in connection with education and vocational
training for prisoners, enhanced post-release supervision, sentencing commissions, and any
other reforms that require short-term expenditures in order to achieve uncertain or intangible
long-term beneÞts. Likewise, reform-minded coalitions may lose steam if crime rates increase
or Þscal pressures ease.
All of this is to suggest that it may matter why the public supports reform. Advocates for
substantive changes in sentencing policy are wiseÑespecially in times of budgetary pres-
sureÑto emphasize the cost-saving potential of their proposals. Yet, over the long run, this
strategy cannot take the place of persuading the public that their proposals represent good
criminal justice policy (from the standpoint, for instance, of fairness or public safety), and not
just good budgetary policy.
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B. What Is the Target of Reform?
From CaliforniaÕs Proposition 36 to ConnecticutÕs modiÞcation of mandatory minimums,
many of the most notable recent reforms have targeted drug sentencing. Indeed, a good case
may be made that the drug policy pendulum is now swinging away from punishment and
towards treatment. This shift, in turn, may be set in the context of a broader movement
away from Òjust say noÓ and towards a world in which drug policy and politics are more
complex and nuanced, perhaps best represented by the legalization of Òmedical marijuanaÓ
in many states, and also by the widespread, often grass-roots, drug court movement.
Viewed in this light, however, recent state sentencing developments may have less to do
with changing attitudes towards crime and criminals and more to do with changing
attitudes towards drugs and addiction. In practice, of course, sorting out these different
categories is nearly impossible. Addiction and intoxication are closely associated with a great
many non-drug crimes. Yet, whether the target is ultimately conceptualized as drug policy
or sentencing policy may have an enormous impact on the politics and content of reform.
For instance, both the California and Connecticut reforms go to great pains to exclude
violent offenders from the beneÞt of the new laws.7 As a matter of practical politics, this may
be unavoidable. (Representative Lawlor, for one, seems to suggest as much.) But, in the
interests of improving drug policy, the reforms may distort sentencing policy. They suggest a
rigid dichotomy between drug crimes and violent crimes. This dichotomy not only disre-
gards the vast range of severity in the conduct that might be categorized as violent, but also
obscures the complicated relationship between drugs and violence.8 Substance abuse and
addiction surely lie behind a great many crimes of violence, which should affect the way we
view the offenderÕs culpability and rehabilitative potential. Conversely, even Ònon-violentÓ
drug crimes may contribute to a drug industry and a drug culture that are responsible for a
great deal of violence. A rational sentencing policy would take these sorts of considerations
into account, rather than creating a per se disparity in the treatment of ÒdrugÓ offenders and
ÒviolentÓ offenders.
Drug sentencing reform offers an opportunity for richer public dialogue on many issues
of great importance to sentencing generally, including the meaning of criminal culpability,
the possibility of rehabilitation, and the viability of intermediate sanctions. As drug reform
gathers steam, it remains to be seen whether other types of sentencing reform will be
carried forward or shunted aside.
C. Who Enacts Reform?
The California and Connecticut reforms, while similar in many respects, represent, in
another sense, dramatically different models of legal change. Connecticut exempliÞes
ÒinsiderÓ reform, with proposals emerging from conventional policymaking sources and
passing through conventional legislative processes. California exempliÞes ÒoutsiderÓ reform,
with proposals being enacted directly by the voters through the ballot initiative. Additional
insider reform may occur soon in Kansas, while additional outsider reform is possible in
states with pending drug treatment initiatives.9 Indeed, both models may play an important
role in state-level sentencing policy changes for many years to come.
Assuming that both insiders and outsiders share the same objectives (at least at the very
general level of seeking to divert relatively low-risk offenders from prison), does it really
matter whether the impetus for reform comes from inside or outside the political establish-
ment? The recent developments proÞled in this and the previous Issue suggest a very
tentative yes: insiders and outsiders may have a tendency to structure reform rather
differently.
First, while insider reforms like those in Connecticut and Louisiana enhance judicial
discretion by scaling back mandatory minimums, the drug treatment initiatives diminish
judicial discretion by prohibiting incarceration of qualifying offenders. These contrasting
tendencies are perhaps to be expected: to the extent that the judiciary belongs to the existing
political establishment, one would expect that political insiders would be more inclined to
trust judges than would outsiders. Second, the current initiative efforts in Ohio and Florida
would amend the respective state constitutions by adding new drug sentencing provisions.
Once again, this is not surprising: it is to be expected that outsiders would want to put
8 F E D E R A L  S E N T E N C I N G  R E P O R T E R  ·  V O L .  1 5 ,  N O.  1  ·  O C TO B E R  2 0 0 2
reforms as far beyond the reach of legislative modiÞcation as possible. At the same time, one
may question the wisdom of constitutionalizing technically complex sentencing laws,
particularly when the chief precedent for these new policiesÑCaliforniaÕs Proposition 36Ñ
has yet to be thoroughly assessed.
Insider reform, in turn, may be accomplished through at least two quite different institu-
tions: a specialized sentencing commission or a legislature. Kansas exempliÞes commission-
initiated reform, while Connecticut exempliÞes reform that was accomplished in the absence
of a commission. In recent years, much skepticism has been expressed about legislative
activity in the sentencing arena, with some suggestion that legislatures are by their very
nature more likely to take a harsh approach to sentencing.10 The experiences in states such as
Connecticut and Louisiana should serve to qualify these sorts of criticisms. At the same time,
there seems little reason to doubt the value, as Wilhelm and Turner demonstrate, of an
expert, nonpartisan sentencing commission in the reform process.
D. What Is the Role of  the Federal Government?
State sentencing law cannot be viewed in isolation from federal law. State criminal jurisdic-
tion substantially overlaps with federal, perhaps most notably in the narcotics area. Else-
where, I have described the disparities between state and federal sentencing practices, which
create important incentives for prosecutorial forum-shopping.11 Through cooperative state-
federal efforts, police and prosecutors can circumvent state sentencing policies by directing
defendants to federal court. Changes in state law that reduce sentence lengths may result in
increased use of the federal forum to compensate for the loss of leverage over defendants in
state court.
At the federal level, clearer policies are needed to deÞne what is appropriately prosecuted
in federal court, and what is best left to state courts. Current ad hoc arrangements not only
lend an air of arbitrariness to sentencing, but they may also compromise state policy choices
on matters that are chießy of state concern, such as the sentencing of low-level drug defen-
dants. To the extent that states are now implementing substantially new paradigms for
handling drug offenses, the urgency of adopting clear federal policies in this area is all the
greater. It is difÞcult to justify a system in which law enforcement ofÞcialsÑexercising
essentially unguided and unreviewable discretionÑdecide whether the crack addict faces a
Þve-year mandatory minimum in federal court or mandatory treatment in lieu of incarcera-
tion in state court.
IV. Conclusion
Faced with crushing budget deÞcits, states will no doubt continue to look to corrections as a
source of cost-savings. This presents new opportunities for sentencing reform, particularly
reform that diverts low-risk offenders from prison in favor of drug treatment and other
rehabilitative programs. Yet, budget pressures need not necessarily lead to more selective use
of incarceration. Instead, the current economic situation may simply lead to reduced
programming for offenders, less effective community supervision, more crowded prisons,
and other budgetary quick-Þxes that may prove in the long run to be penny-wise and pound-
foolish. At the state level, this is a time of unusual opportunity and unusual risk.
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